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further proceed to prove a negative and to show that the
risk and inconvenience in any particular class of cases
'vere not excessive. Much is made in the appellants'
evidence of the fact that calling at a British port "\Vould
have taken the Leonora across a German mine field, but
it is very noticeable that throughout the case the very
numerous instances of losses by German action are cases
of losses by the action of submarines and not by mines.
The appellants filed a series of affidavits, stating in identical terms that in proceeding to a British port of call
vessels would incur very great risk of attack by submarines, especially if unaccompanied by an armed
-escort. Of the possibility of obtaining an armed escort
or other similar protection they say nothing, apparently
because they never had any intention of complying "\Yith
the order in council, and therefore were not concerned to
ascertain how much danger or how little their compliance
would really involve. Proof of the amount of danger
involved in crossing the mine field in itself is singularly
lacking, but the fact is plain that after a voyage of no
-extraordinary character the Leonora did reach Har,vich
in safety.
Under these circumstances their lordships see no su:ffi·c ient reason why, on a question of fact, as this question
is, they should differ from the considered conclusion of
the president. He was satisfied that the order in council
did not involve greater hazard or prejudice to the neutral
trade in question than was commensurate with the
gravity of the enemy outrages and the common need for
their repression, and their lordships are not minded te
disturb his finding. The appeals accordingly fail. Their
lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that they
should be dismissed with costs.
THE "DUSSELDORF."
[PRIVY CouNCIL.]
ON APPEAL FROM THE PRIZE COURT, ENGLAND.
July 29, 1920.
[1920] A. C. 1034.

Appeal from that portion of a decree of the president
of the admiralty division (in prize), 81 dated May 12,
1919, which has disallowed a claim in respect of costs and
11
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damages incurred by reason of the capture and detention
of the German steamship Diisseldorf and her cargo. The
claim and the appeal were on behalf of the Norwegian
Government, and were made under the circumstances
appearing in the judgment of their lordships.
ot
July 29. The judgment of their lordships was delivered by Lord Sumner. In this case the Dilsseldorf, a.
German ship, was making her way from Narvik, with a
cargo of iron ore, down the Norwegian coast toward the
entrance to the Baltic, and so to Emden. Her object
was to keep within Norwegian territorial waters, so as to
baffle capture by British men-of-war. She was taken by
H. M.S. Tay and Tyne at a point off Buholmen and Grisholmen, which was, as it turned out, a little (say, 200
yards) within the territorial limits. The learned president, Lord Sterndale, found that the commander of the
Tay and Tyne had no intention of violating Norwegian
neutrality, but that, by an error of judgment, which their
lordships consider to have been very pardonable, he conceived that the 3-mile line should be drawn a little
farther to the east than its true position. It is plain that
the German shipowners had a narrow and somewhat
lucky escape, and that the sovereignty of Norway suffered
the minimum of prejudice from this unintentional violation.
The present claim was made on behalf of His Majesty
the King of Norway by the appellant, Mr. Waldemar
Eckell, the Royal Norwegian consul general in London.
His claim was, first, for delivery up of the Dusseldorf and
·her cargo or its proceeds; secondly, for the cost of removing her to Norway; thirdly, for costs and fees payable to
the marshal of the prize court or otherwise upon her
delivery; and fourthly, the vessel having been regularly
requisitioned by His Majesty's Government pending the
hearing before the prize court, for an account of profits
made by the Crown from the use of the ship, or alternatively, for payment of a reasonable sum for her use.
of
It may be well to consider in the first instance how this
matter stands, apart from authority. In the vessel herself and her cargo, on their own ,account, the Norwegian
Government have neither right, title, nor interest, nor
h ad they ever even possession. The German o'vners
have all the right and interest, and, in the absence of any
treaty or convention dealing with the case, they can
neither come before the court directly as claimants nor
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can they be allowed to do indirectly what is directly
incompetent. Indeed, as against them, the capture is
good, being the capture of enemy property; and the
"claim of territory," as it is called, is one which is available to the territorial sovereign only, and not to the private shipowner. These considerations, apart from the
validity and effect of orders, regularly made, permitting
the admiralty to requisition the vessel, at once dispose
of the fourth claim, namely, that for profits or freight, or
hire in respect of the benefit which the British Government obtained from requisitioning the vessel under the
prize rules. If the appellant recovered any such sum, it
'vould be held simply in the interest of the enemy owners.
No claim has been made, nor has any evidence been given,
on the footing that the Norwegian Government have come
under any pecuniary liability to the owners of the Dusseldorf, nor is there any suggestion that the seizure involved
them in any outlay or pecuniary disadvantage outside of
these proceedings. No one would wish to make light of
a violation of territorial sovereignty ' but in itself this is ritorial
Violation or tersovereign a matter arising between sovereigns and, apart from the ty.
peculiar position of captors who are bound to being their
alleged prize before the court, it would in itself be nonjusticiable, for in effect the prize court 'vould be called
on to pronounce a decree, founded on the conduct of his
offices, against the sovereign in virtue of whose commission it is authorized to act, and to evaluate imponderable
wrongs, which lie outside the category of those 'vith 'vhich
it is wont to deal.
A court of prize is not, a.s such, a disciplinary tribunal
for officers in His Majesty's Navy, charged with the correction of errors committed by them while discharging
their duties. Any complaint against such officers 'vhich
the Government of Norway might have, and any claim
for amends for an invasion of the territorial sovereignty
of Norway, would fitly be preferred through diplomatic
channels to His Majesty's Government for examination
and redress.
The facts that the court found itself regularly in pos- Requisition.
session of the Du.sseldor_f, and subsequently made a
regular order giving leave to requisition her, are at
once the foundation of the jurisdiction and the occasion
of the Norwegian Government's appearance. It is a
fortunate circumstance that the ancient practice, by
which courts of prize entertain litigious claims of this
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kind made on behalf of neutral powers, led long ago to
the submission of one class of international questions, at
any rate, to a judicial determination instead of to the
arbitrament of arms, and so provided for a solution of
vexed questions at once peaceful, honorable, and friendly.
It may, therefore, well be that the rules which apply to
capture on the high seas are by no means closely applicable to capture in neutral territorial waters. On the
high seas, if there is reasonable ground for detention, the
risk of it is one which even a neutral must run, and the
appropriate remedy is the release of the ship in this
country. In neutral waters, on the other hand, no
.capture should be made at all, and rules applicable to
the high seas are not in pari materia. Simple release of
the ship in this country to the claimant sovereign may
be an inadequate redress. The fact that the court has
duly received into its charge and jurisdiction a ship 'vhich
ought not to have been seized at all, leads to the conclusion that the true claim of the appellant is for a
restitutio in integrum, so far as the Government of
Norway is concerned; but that, naturally as their lordships 'vould incline to a treatment of it as liberal and
ungrudging as possible, they are still bound to act
judicially and to follow legal principles and the decisions
already given in prize cases.
The authorities prior in date to the recent war are
few in number and -are some,vhut indeterminate. In
ca~es between captors and private owners the jurisdiction to award damages and costs against the former on
the ground of their misconduct, or to refuse to give
then1 in favor of the latter where their conduct had been
suspicious or irregular, was long ago well recognized,
but the language used in stating the grounds of it was not
uniform. Sometimes Sir William Scott spoke of such
decrees as giving compensation to the suffering owners,
whether the misconduct of the captors was intentional
or not; sometimes they were made avowedly as a punishment to deter others, generally privateers, from the
repetition of offenses. In the Ostsee 82 the Privy Council
laid it down that the foriner is the better view, though,
if so, it is not easy to appreciate the relevancy of inquiring
whether the captors acted under a reasonable mistake.
From such a jurisdiction little guidance is to be obtained
in the present case. Of actual ·" clain1s of territory.,
s2
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but few are reported. There are three decisions of
Sir William Scott-The Twee Gebroeders, 83 the Vrow
..L4.nna Catharina, 84 and the Anna 85-and during the
present war, in addition to the present case, there have
been the Lokken (July 26, 1918) , 86 the Valeria/'1 and the
Pellworm (Apr. 21, 1920). 88 No point has been argued
in the present case as to the effect of the provisions of
the treaty of Versailles, such as was discussed in the
P ellworm. 88
In the Vrow Anna Catharina, 89 Sir William Scott
observes: "The sanctity of a claim of territory is undoubtedly very high. * * * When the fact is established, it overrules every other consideration. The
capture is done away; the property must be restored,
notwithstanding that it may actually belong to the
enemy; and if the captor should appear to have erred
'villfully, and not merely through ignorance, he would
be subject to further punishment."
In the Twee Gebroeder8 83 the same great authority
condemned the conduct of the captors as having been
in violation of a neutral sovereign's rights; but held that,
as they had not intended to commit any wrong, and as
it was not easy for them to have ascertained "'here the
neutral boundary ran, they ought not to be held liable
in damages and costs. On the other hand, in the .Anna, 85
'vhich was the case of a privateer and not of a regular
King's ship, there had been deliberate abuse of the territorial waters of the United States, and in a claim of
territory restitution of the captured vessel was accompanied with a decree for payment of damages and costs.
It. does not appear what the measure of these damages
was, or whether the Governn1ent of the United States
had been put to actual expense by the conduct of the
privateer.
In the present case there can be no doubt that the appellant was entitled to have the Dusseldorf (and the proceeds of the cargo) released to him on behalf of His
~lajesty the King of Norway. Had the naval officer's
error been brought to the notice of the British Govern11
17
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ment forthwith, before the Dusseldorf was brought before
the prize court, her prompt return to Norway on behalf
of the Crown, with sui table expressions of regret and regard, 'vould, it can hardly be doubted, have been an
ample satisfaction to the King of Norway for the unintentional wrong done. In the event, which has happened,
of the ship's being placed in the prize court, the question
now is what further relief, if any, should be accorded to
the claimant.
1
The learned president, Lord Sterndale, before whom
this question was hardly sufficiently argued, decided, on
the authority of the Twee Gebroeders (90 ), that there was
. D~mages for vi- no ground for decreeing such costs and damages to the
Otatlon of neutrality.
claimant as it has been the practice to grant where the
violation of neutrality has been high-handed, negligent,
or designed. If this were the sole ground on which the
matter could be put, there can be no doubt that his decision ought to be affirmed.
It is, however, now on fuller argument contended that,
as the right of the Norwegian Government is at least for
restoration, this involves either the physical redelivery of
the Dusseldorf in Norwegian waters, which is not really
asked for, or the payment of the costs of her return voyage. The ground is that, if this be not so, the Norwegian
Government must either pay this expense, and so suffer
pecuniarily for the error of a British officer, or leave the
German owners to navigate the vessel for themselves.
In any case, as between the Norwegian Government and
persons whose property at the time of the seizure was
within the territorial jurisdiction of the King of Norway
and sub protectione regis, this would place his Government in the invidious position of leaving them without
any redress at all for a seizure which occurred not,vi thstanding their claim to the protection of the N orwegain
Crown. There is a further matter for consideration,
which is this. If the hearing had been completed and
the release had been decreed, flagrante bello, as might
have been the case, and if the Norwegian Government, to
avoid expense and responsibility for 'vhich they 'vould
receive no recompense, had forthwith handed the Dusseldorf over to her owners before she had reached the security
of neutral waters, she might have been captured again.
In that case the Government of His Majesty the King of
Norway might have been exposed to the observation that
oo 3 C. Rob. 162.
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their proceedings resulted merely in the vindication of
the public sovereignty of the Kindom of Norway without
advantage or redress to the private rights which had suffered interference while within the limits of that realm.
Their lordships think that this argument is well founded,
and that, alike from the necessity of performing and paying for the voyage to Norway at their own expense, and
from the possibility of being exposed to any such reflection, the Norwegian Government ought to be protected.
They are therefore entitled to costs of the voyage to Nor'vay paid and borne by them.
The claim for repaYJnent of the marshal's fees and other pa~:t ~~r m~~:
similar sums rests on a different footing. Here the impor- ~hal's fees.
tant points are that the ship came regularly into the
custody of the officers of the court and, but for the
requisitioning, which also was a regular proceeding,
would have remained throughout in its charge, and so
would have had the benefit of care and protection, which
would inure! to enhance. the vessel's value or avert
depreciation. Even in the hands of the Admiralty, she
has necessarily had the benefit of a certain amount of
upkeep in the ordinary course of user, and there is no
suggestion of ill-usage, neglect, or willful deterioration.
Although, as now appears, the captors had no legal right
to possession, they were in fact in possession in all good
faith, and, in placing the ship and cargo in the custody
of the marshal, they acted in discharge of an obligation
of a very binding character, from the observance of which
it would be most inexpedient in any way to deter persons
in their position. Further, in a matter of costs it is particularly necessary to observe settled rules of practice, for
costs are always somewhat artificial matters and dependent on the practice of the court. It has been laid do'vn in
the Franciska 91 by their lordships' board that such costs
as those now in question are properly charges on the property itself, because it is for the benefit of whom it may
concern that the ship and cargo should be placed in the
care and custody of the marshal of the court. This decision is, of course, binding upon their lordships, and they
therefore think that these charges form a proper charge
against the ship and fall to be discharged by those to
'vhom she is delivered up, nor is it necessary or appropriate to inquire under what form or by what process, if
0110

Moo. P . C. 73.

202

Declsloo,

INTERNATIONAL LAW: DECISIONS AND NOTES.

any, they may be recovered over from the Geruutu
owners.
It is possible that some part or the whole of the costs
of transferring the Dusseldorf to neutral waters has been
paid, or contracted to be paid, by her owners, and so has
not fallen, or, if they perform their contract, will not
ultimately fall, on the Government of Norway. In such
a case the appellant will not recover them in these proceedings.
In the result the appeal will be allowed with costs, and
the decree of the president will be varied by directing
that the appellant is entitled to be paid such expenses of
removing the Dusseldorf from British waters to Norwegian or other neutral waters as may have fallen, or will
ultimately fall, on the Government of Norway, but otherwise the decision of the president 'vill be affirmed. The
case will be remitted to the prize caurt to make the necessary formal decree and to direct a reference to the registrar. Their lordships will humbly advise His Majesty to
this effect.

